Brexit – the gift that keeps on taking

As we edge closer to the 10^th anniversary of the Brexit Referendum, there’s still much debate about the impact of this momentous decision: A May 2025 poll by YouGov found 13 % of respondents said Brexit had been more of a success, 62 % said it had been more of a failure, and 20 % said it was neither.

So, which is it? Good, bad, indifferent? From a purely business perspective, are things better or worse?

Let’s take a look at the facts:

Growth, trade & investment

• Macro impact vs a “Remain” world: The OBR still builds its forecasts on UK imports/exports volumes being 15% lower than otherwise, implying 4% lower potential productivity in the long run. Keep in mind that this judgment underpins many public-finance calculations, including how much tax you pay and what cuts you suffer.

• GDP “gap” estimates: Independent trackers generally place UK GDP at 2–5% below a no-Brexit counterfactual by 2024/25. (Range reflects different methods).

• Business investment: Research by the Bank of England and the Economics Observatory finds UK business investment is 10% lower than it would have been without Brexit.

• Trade composition: In 2024, the EU still took 41% of UK exports (48% of goods; 36% of services). Goods exports to the EU were 18% below 2019 in real terms, while services exports to the EU were 19% above 2019 (real).

  
  

Prices, border frictions & import controls

• Food prices: LSE/CEP attribute a 6% cumulative extra food-price inflation (up to March 2023) to post-Brexit trade barriers- about £250 per household per year and £6 –7bn nationally over that window.

• New UK import charges & checks: Since 30 Apr 2024, the Border Target Operating Model has introduced SPS checks and a Common User Charge of £10–£29 per commodity line (capped at £145 per CHED) at Dover/Eurotunnel. Industry/analyst estimates put aggregate business costs in the £2bn ballpark for the first year, though the government disputes large pass-through to prices.

• Ongoing SPS friction example: Shellfish exports remain sensitive to interpretation/enforcement of rules; there have been high-profile recent losses on rejected consignments.

  
  

Labour supply & mobility

• From free movement to visas: After 2020, EU citizens became a small share of work-visa grantees (7% of 369k work visas in 2024), a marked shift versus pre-Brexit inflows. The EU Settlement Scheme has granted status to approximately 5.7m people, stabilising much of the resident EU workforce, but new inflows are structurally lower.

• Sectoral shortages: Agriculture/care/food processing have experienced notable recruitment gaps. Select official/industry evidence cites continuing vacancies and waste (e.g., £60m of fruit & veg wasted in H1-2022 attributed to workforce shortages).

  
  

Regulation & compliance (costs avoided and added)

• Product conformity marks: The UK has indefinitely recognised the EU’s CE mark for most DBT-regulated products in Great Britain (and broadened scope in 2024), avoiding duplicate testing/re-labelling costs for many manufacturers; Northern Ireland continues to recognise CE under the Windsor Framework. Medical devices are on a path towards indefinite recognition, per July 2025 signalling.

• Border model (BTOM): Efforts have been made to streamline and digitise the staged roll-out of recurring fees per-shipment, but added costs, complexity and delay risks remain. These issues rise exponentially depending on product risk category - mainly in the shape of added port health charges and higher risk of cargo spoilage due to long processing times at Channel ports.

  
  

Financial services & the City

• Equivalence and market share shifts: The EU extended UK CCP (clearing house) equivalence to 30 June 2028, reflecting stability concerns. This is a qualified win for the City, even as the EU promotes on-shoring via EMIR 3.0. Separately, euro-share trading shifted from London to EU venues - think Paris and Frankfurt - in Jan 2021 and has largely stayed there ever since.

Who’s been hit or helped?

• SMEs & goods-heavy traders: Micro and small exporters bear disproportionate fixed-cost burdens (rules of origin, SPS, intermediaries). A firm-level LSE/CEP study estimates goods exports £27bn lower in 2022, with 14% (approx. 16,400) of prior EU-exporting firms ceasing EU exports after the TCA took effect.

• Services relative resilience: Services trade has outperformed goods since 2019; by 2024, UK services exports to the EU were +19% (real) vs 2019.

• Importers of agrifood & inputs: Face new certification, checks and per-line fees under BTOM; charges apply even if consignments aren’t ultimately inspected.

Bottom line

The centre-of-gravity findings are consistent across official and academic sources: A smaller, more fragmented trading relationship with the EU has left the UK with lower trade intensity, weaker investment, workforce shortages and a GDP level a few percentage points below where it likely would have been - with ongoing frictions in goods (especially food/animal origin) but more resilience in services. Some regulatory choices have contained compliance costs, but new border operating costs have emerged and are now firmly embedded.

The final word

As the Chancellor prepares her November budget, where she is expected to raise taxes and make cuts to fill a £40bn hole in public finances, it’s worth reflecting on the points above – and how we got where we are. Brexit is costing all of us more every year. However, it is important to note - this is not a disaster created by voters. It’s a disaster created by desperate politicians acting in their best personal interests.

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